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INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses the significant developments in Illinois insurance law. During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court
Partner, Sedgwick, Detert, Moran and Arnold, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., 1976, Fairfield University; J.D., 1980, John Marshall Law School.
** B.A., 1982, University of Michigan; J.D. candidate, 1991, Loyola University of
Chicago.
*
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considered issues relating to the effect of an insurer's disclaimer of
2
the initial permission rule' and insurance company liquidations.
Illinois appellate courts resolved important issues regarding the
meaning of "loading and unloading" for common carrier liability
coverage purposes;3 the interpretation of the pollution exclusion in
the comprehensive general liability policy as applied to third party
polluters;4 and the obligations of an insurer whose policy is lapsed,
but who has failed to file a certificate of cancellation with the Illinois Commerce Commission. 5 Illinois appellate courts also considered the definition of "occurrence" in a liability policy; 6 claims
made requirements for reporting purposes;7 an excess carrier's liability for post-judgment interest;' and the right of health care providers/assignees to recover payment from HMOs.9 Finally, the
Illinois General Assembly passed legislation mandating that alien
insurers maintain a deposit of assets within the State,10 and it added long-term health care within the classification of life or endowment insurance in the Insurance Code."1
II.

THE INSURER'S

DUTY TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY

A.

Effect of Policy Disclaimerof the Initial Permission Rule
Illinois' financial responsibility statute 2 regulates taxicab drivers
under the Illinois Vehicle Code.' 3 Under the statute, a taxicab
1. See infra notes 12-48 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 261-83 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 49-75 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 76-109 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 110-141 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 142-78 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 179-98 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 199-222 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 223-59 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 8-101 (1983). The Illinois financial responsibility
statute provides, in pertinent part:
[The] surety of [a] bond shall provide for payment of each judgment by the
owner of the motor vehicle ... provided each said judgment shall have been
rendered against such owner or any person operating the motor vehicle with the
owner's express or implied consent, for any injury to or death of any person or
for damage to property other than such motor vehicle, resulting from the negligence of such owner, his agent, or any person operating the motor vehicle with
his express or implied consent....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 8-104(2) (1983).
13. Financial responsibility statutes are remedial laws which require proof of drivers'
financial ability to cover potential liability. 12A G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON and M.
RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 45.733 (2d ed. rev. 1981) [hereinafter COUCH]. Such
statutes are intended to protect the public from loss by injury or death caused by the
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company must obtain omnibus coverage for all its motor vehicles.1 4
In 1973, Illinois adopted the initial permission doctrine, 5 which
provides that when a named insured gives initial permission to another to drive the insured vehicle, the insured's policy will provide
coverage to any subsequent driver. 6 Under the initial permission
doctrine, an insurer provides coverage even when the subsequent
driver deviates from the scope of authority originally granted him
by the insured, as long as the subsequent driver did not engage in
theft or tortious conversion to gain access to the car.' 7 In American Country Insurance Co. v. Wilcoxon,"s the Illinois Supreme
Court held that a surety may not exclude coverage under the terms
of a surety bond issued pursuant to the Illinois financial responsibility statute regulating taxicab drivers when those terms are contrary to the initial permission doctrine.' 9 Thus, a private limiting
contract, such as a surety bond, cannot negate the financial responsibility statute.20
In Wilcoxon, a cab company purchased a bond from American
Country (the "surety") to comply with the Illinois financial responsibility statute. 2' The taxicab company leased one of its cabs
negligence of an insured or the insured's agent, servant, or independent contractor.
American Country Ins. Co. v. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d 230, 239, 537 N.E.2d 284, 289
(1989).
14. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d at 242, 537 N.E.2d at 290.
15. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 54 Ill. 2d 333, 297 N.E.2d
163 (1973).
16. Id. at 342, 297 N.E.2d at 167-68.
17. Id.
18. 127 Ill. 2d 230, 537 N.E.2d 284 (1989).
19. Id. at 232, 537 N.E.2d at 285.
20. Id. at 241, 537 N.E.2d at 289.
21. Id. at 232, 537 N.E.2d at 285. The bond provided that the surety could satisfy
any judgment "resulting from negligence of such Owner/Principal[,] his agent, or any
person operating the motor vehicle with his express or implied consent, in the penal sum
of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars." Id. The term "express or implied consent"
was defined in an unsigned rider attached to the bond:
(c) Express or implied consent is a motor vehicle described in this instrument
which is being used with the express or implied consent of [the insured cab
company] when it is being used by (i) an employee of [the insured cab company]
while operating said motor vehicle in the course and scope of his employment;
(ii) a lessee of [the insured cab company] while operating said motor vehicle
pursuant to a written lease. This bond shall apply to any permitte [sic], sublessee, or bailee or an employee or lessee of [the insured cab company]. It is the
specifice [sic] agreement and intention of [the surety] and [the insured cab company] that the doctrine known as the Initial Permission Doctrine shall not apply
(emphasis added).
Id. at 232-33, 537 N.E.2d at 285. The court noted that this definition was "nearly incomprehensible." Id.
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to a driver/lessee for a 24-hour period. 22 Under the terms of the
lease agreement, the cab company provided insurance coverage for
both the driver and the cab company.23 The lease also provided
that the lessee agreed to be the sole driver of the taxicab.2 4 Despite
the terms of the lease, the driver gave possession of the leased cab
to a third party. 2 While the third party was driving the cab, he
struck and injured a pedestrian, resulting in a personal injury suit
brought by the pedestrian against both the cab company and the
driver.26 The insured cab company provided notice of the personal
injury litigation to the surety under the terms of the bond.27 The
surety, however, disclaimed coverage under the terms of the bond
for any judgment against the insured cab company because the
third party driver was not the lessee who was permitted to drive
the cab under the terms of the lease.28
The surety subsequently filed a declaratory judgment suit
against the pedestrian, the insured cab company and the third
party (collectively, the "appellees"), alleging that it had no obligation to indemnify the insured cab company because the third party
driver was not the original lessee. 29 The surety argued that parties
to an insurance contract specifically may avoid the initial permission rule.3 0 Further, the surety maintained that the bond clearly
applied only to an employee or lessee of insured cab company operating pursuant to a written lease.3 ' Moreover, the lessor's transfer
of possession of the rented cab to a person who was not the insured
cab company's agent or employee was without the knowledge or
consent of the insured cab company. 32 Therefore, the surety maintained that the bond served notice that the initial permission doctrine would not apply.33
The appellees contended that the initial permission rule applied
to extend coverage to all successive drivers that operated a vehicle
used in public transportation, 34 and that an insurance company
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.

233, 537 N.E.2d at 285.
233, 537 N.E.2d at 285-86.
233, 537 N.E.2d at 286.

232, 537 N.E.2d at 285.
231, 537 N.E.2d at 285.
235, 537 N.E.2d at 286.
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may not contract away the application of the initial permission
rule. 35 Additionally, the appellees asserted that the Illinois financial responsibility statute mandates that restrictive terms in an insurance contract may not impair omnibus coverage. a6
The trial court granted summary judgment for the surety and
held that the surety owed no duty to pay or indemnify the insured
cab company under the terms of the bond. 37 On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District reversed. 38 The appellate court held that the initial permission doctrine applied despite
the lease provision forbidding the original driver to permit anyone
else to drive the taxicab.39 In effect, the appellate court held that
the insured cab. company gave its constructive consent to the lessee
to permit the third party to operate the cab40
In affirming the appellate decision, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that parties to an insurance contract or surety bond cannot
privately contract away obligations imposed by the financial responsibility statute.4 Therefore, cab owners and their sureties
could not exclude successive cabdrivers from coverage.4 2 The majority reasoned that the plain requirements of the financial responsibility law reflected a legislative intent to compensate those injured
through the negligence of cabdrivers who drive cabs owned by
others.4 3 According to the court, the rationale underlying the initial permission rule is that an insurance contract is as much for the
35. Id. at 235, 537 N.E.2d at 287. The appellees relied on two Illinois Supreme Court
decisions to demonstrate that an insurer could not exclude coverage through such a disclaimer. See United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. McManus, 64 Ill. 2d 239, 356
N.E.2d 78 (1976); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 54 Ill. 2d 333, 297
N.E.2d 163 (1973); see also supra note 12 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 8-104(2)).
36. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d at 235, 537 N.E.2d at 287.
37. Id. at 234, 537 N.E.2d at 286.
38. Id. at 234-35, 537 N.E.2d at 286.
39. Id.
40. Id. The appellate court stressed that the importance of the financial responsibility
statute transcended the private agreement between the surety and the cab company because the statute served to protect the public. Id. at 234, 537 N.E.2d at 286. According to
the court, the insured cab company and the surety privately could not agree to diminish
the effect of the Illinois statute in their private agreement because the Illinois legislature
had codified the initial permission doctrine in the financial responsibility statute. Id. at
235, 537 N.E.2d at 286.
41. Id. at 241, 537 N.E.2d at 289. "The effect of a financial responsibility act may be
to invalidate an exception contained in the policy, which would otherwise be valid, and
thereby provide coverage which would otherwise not exist." COUCH, supra note 13, at

§ 45.743.
42. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d at 241, 537 N.E.2d at 290.
43. Id. at 239, 537 N.E.2d at 288 (citing Stewart v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Ill. 2d
337, 341, 504 N.E.2d 84 (1987); City of Springfield v. Board of Election Comm., 105 Ill.
2d 336, 341, 473 N.E.2d 1313 (1985)).
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public's benefit as for that of the insured. 4
The court further reasoned that cab owners and their insurers
would be able to avoid the workings of the financial responsibility
statute if they were permitted to limit their statutorily imposed liability through terms of their insurance contract. 45 The majority
concluded that when a financial responsibility law requires insurance coverage, any provisions contained in a bond or policy that
conflict with law are void, and the statute controls. 46 Thus, the
clause in the contract that negated the applicability of the initial
permission doctrine was void because it conflicted with the financial responsibility law.
In Wilcoxon, the divided Illinois Supreme Court advanced public policy arguments to provide indemnity protection for loss suffered by third parties. In accomplishing this result, the court
negated the surety's attempt to circumvent the Illinois financial responsibility statute. The court expressed its unwillingness to permit
parties to an insurance contract to deprive the public of the statutorily required indemnity protection. In protecting both the public
44. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d at 240, 537 N.E.2d at 289.
45. Id. at 241, 537 N.E.2d at 289.
46. Id. at 241, 537 N.E.2d at 289. See COUCH, supra note 13, at § 45.738 (2d ed. rev.
1981) (when a policy is executed under a financial responsibility statute, provisions of the
policy that conflict with the statute are void because the policy cannot operate to cut off
the rights of injured third persons); Harper v. City Mut. Ins. Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 694, 385
N.E.2d 75 (1st Dist. 1978) (approval of policy provision does not validate the provision if
it violates statute); Bertini v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 851, 362
N.E.2d 1355 (1st Dist. 1977) (statutes that are in full force when insurance policy is
issued control, and conflicting policy provisions are void). Chief Justice Moran argued in
the dissent that the majority incorrectly interpreted the initial permission doctrine.
Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d at 244, 537 N.E.2d at 291 (Moran, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the majority used the 1973 Maryland Casualty decision, which interpreted a
private contract of insurance to interpret a statutory provision passed in 1957. Id. As a
result, by means of judicial legislation, the majority had raised the rule of contract construction recognized in Maryland Casualty to substantive law. Id. at 246, 537 N.E.2d at
292. Further, the dissent maintained that the Illinois legislature could not have intended
that the financial responsibility statute would mandate the initial permission doctrine,
because Illinois had not recognized that doctrine when the legislature passed the law in
1957. Id.
47. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d at 241, 537 N.E.2d at 289. The clause is set forth supra note
21. The court analogized the present case to a similar California case. Id. at 241-242, 537
N.E.2d at 289-90 (citing Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 65 Cal. 2d 100, 416 P.2d
801 (1966)). In Armstrong, a car rental agreement limited use of rented cars to the lessee
or his family or employees. Id. A nonlessee driver was involved in an accident while
driving the car with the lessee's permission. Id. The insurer attempted to disclaim coverage under restrictive terms of the lease that limited coverage to certain classes of permissive users. Id. The California Supreme Court held that the restrictive terms were invalid
because they conflicted with California's Financial Responsibility Act. Id. at 242, 537
N.E.2d at 290.
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and insurance purchasers, the court reaffirmed that the insurers
will not be permitted to frustrate the legislative intent behind financial responsibility laws by use of inconsistent policy provisions.48
B. Loading and Unloading Clauses
Liability policies on trucks and commercial vehicles frequently
include clauses that provide indemnification for losses incurred resulting from "loading and unloading. ' 49 Illinois courts have
adopted the complete operations doctrine5 0 in interpreting the term
of "loading and unloading" for liability purposes.5 Under this
doctrine, the loading and unloading clause applies to any movement of the goods from the moment the insured possesses them
until the insured delivers them to their destination.5 2 In Merit Insurance Co. v. ParentBuilding Materials,53 the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District considered whether, under the complete operations doctrine, an automobile liability insurance policy's
loading and unloading clause provides coverage for an injury suffered one full day after completion of the unloading.54 The court
held that the injury need not be contemporaneous with the unloading when negligence is involved.5
48. Id. at 241, 537 N.E.2d at 289-90. Cf Bisco v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Ill. App.
3d 280, 530 N.E.2d 1163 (3d Dist. 1988), leave to appeal denied, 124 Ill.
2d 553, 535
N.E.2d 912 (1989). In Bisco, a delivery service purchased statutorily required insurance
for its delivery van. Bisco, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 282, 530 N.E.2d at 1164. The insurance
policy contained an unambiguous exclusion for damages incurred while the van was being repaired or serviced. Id. A body shop employee, who was driving the van to his
employer's shop for repairs, struck a vehicle driven by the plaintiff. Id. The insurer denied coverage under the policy based on the vehicle repair exclusion. Id. The plaintiff
urged the court to compel the insurer to provide coverage under various financial responsibility statutes. Id. Although the body shop employee had the insured's permission to
operate the van at the time of the collision, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third
District held that use of the insured's van at the time of the accident did not fall within
the purview of the financial responsibility statutes. Id. The court noted that at the time of
the collision, the van was not being used in the business of transportation. Id. at 283, 530
N.E.2d at 1164. Thus, even though operation of the vehicle ordinarily would activate
statutorily compulsory insurance provisions, the use of the van in this instance was
outside the purview of the statutes. Id. at 283, 530 N.E.2d at 1165-66.
49. 6B J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW and PRACTICE § 4322 (Buckley ed. rev.
1979) [hereinafter APPLEMAN]. As with the construction of all clauses, the terms "loading" and "unloading" must be construed according to the ordinary and popular meaning
of such terms. See generally 12 COUCH, supra note 13, at § 45.738.
50. 12 COUCH, supra note 13, at § 45:128. Any occurrence during or arising out of
the process of unloading is covered. Id.
51. Estes Co. v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 79 Ill.
2d 228, 402 N.E.2d 613 (1980).
52. 12 COUCH, supra note 13, at § 45:128.
53. 176 Il.App. 3d 965, 531 N.E.2d 1015 (1st Dist. 1988).
54. Id. at 967, 531 N.E.2d at 1016.
55. Id. at 969, 531 N.E.2d at 1017.
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In Merit Insurance Company, the insured was a plasterboard
supplier who had an insurance policy that provided comprehensive
automobile liability and comprehensive general liability coverage.5 6
The insured sold and delivered sheets of plasterboard for use at a
construction site. 57 The insured's employees unloaded the plasterboard and left.5 s A subcontractor suffered injuries when a stack of
the plasterboard fell on him a day after it was delivered.59 Subsequently, the subcontractor filed suit against the insured, alleging
that the insured improperly stacked the plasterboard sheets after
delivery. 60 The insured tendered the lawsuit's defense to its automobile liability insurance carrier, which accepted the defense
under a reservation of rights. 61 The insurer then filed a declaratory
judgment suit, alleging that the insurance policy issued to the in62
sured did not provide liability coverage for the occurrence.
The insurer argued that it had no duty to indemnify the insured
because the incident did not occur during nor did it arise out of the
unloading, as the policy required.63 The insurer stressed that the
insured had completed the unloading of the plasterboard one full
6 In contrast, the insured
day before the injury.M
maintained that
the insurer should provide coverage because the insured's loading
and unloading allegedly caused the subcontractor's injuries. 6
The trial court granted summary judgment in the insured's
favor.66 The appellate court affirmed and held that the insurer
should defend the insured under the "loading and unloading"
clause. 67 The appellate court explained that the accident must
have occurred during and must be causally connected with the process of loading and unloading to come within the scope of a pol56. Id. at 967, 531 N.E.2d at 1016. The auto liability portion of the policy contained
the following endorsement:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of... bodily injury or...
property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use, includingloading and unloading, of any automobile ....
Id. (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 966, 531 N.E.2d at 1016.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 966-67, 531 N.E.2d at 1016.
63. Id. at 967, 531 N.E.2d at 1016.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 966, 531 N.E.2d at 1016.
66. Id. at 976, 531 N.E.2d at 1016.
67. Id. at 969, 531 N.E.2d at 1018.
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icy's "loading and unloading" clause.6" Illinois had never adopted
a standard to apply to an allegation of a completed but negligent
unloading.6 9 The court, however, followed a Louisiana case, which
held that a court should inquire into whether the act causing injury
was a part of the "unloading" process.70 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the relevant inquiry was whether the negligent
stacking was part of the unloading process.71
The court stated that the complete operations doctrine requires a
determination of whether the accident in question arose out of the
defective delivery or would not have occurred but for that defective
delivery.72 An injured party or the insured need prove only that
the events giving rise to the claim arose out of the vehicle's use and
were related to such use.7 3 Therefore, the injury did not have to be
contemporaneous with the unloading. 74 Although the injuries occurred one day after the insured had stacked the plasterboard, the
court held that the insured was covered because the injury allegedly arose out of a negligent unloading. 7
Insurers will likely attempt to restrict policy terms in light of the
court's expansive interpretation of the loading and unloading
clause in Parent Building Materials. From the insurer's perspective, inserting the word "active" into the term "loading and unloading," or imposing a time restriction for coverage, might serve
to accomplish the insurer's intent.
C.

The Pollution Exclusion

In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental
7 6 ("CERCLA"). 77
Response Compensation and Liability Act
68. Id. at 967-68, 531 N.E.2d at 1017.
69. Id. at 968, 531 N.E.2d at 1017.
70. Id. (citing Copes v. Copeland Bldg. Supply, 415 So. 2d 264, 266 (La. Ct. App.
1982)). In Copes, a young girl was injured when a stack of sheetrock fell on her. Copes,
415 So. 2d at 265. A contractor's employee had stacked the sheetrock earlier in the day.
Id. The girl testified that she had done nothing to cause the sheetrock to fall. Id. at 268.
The court held that the girl's injury arose from the unloading of the sheetrock. Id.
71. Merit Insurance Co., 176 Ill. App. 3d at 968, 531 N.E.2d at 1017.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 969, 531 N.E.2d at 1017.
75. Id. at 969, 531 N.E.2d at 1017-1018. Because there was a dearth of authority in
Illinois, the court cited decisions from other jurisdictions as persuasive authority. See
New Deal Lumber and Millwork Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 738
(E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1974) (roll of linoleum fell on child several
hours after delivery man had unloaded it); Dodson v. Key, 508 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. Ct. App.
1974) (person injured by falling sheetrock which had been unloaded six hours earlier).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982).
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CERCLA authorizes designated governmental agencies to clean
up hazardous waste sites and surcharge "responsible parties." 7
Once designated as either "responsible parties" or "potentially responsible parties" by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("USEPA") under CERCLA, insureds have sought coverage from their comprehensive general liability insurers for environmental clean-up costs.7 9 Many insurers have disclaimed coverage
under their policies by invoking the pollution exclusion, which is a
standard exclusion in comprehensive general liability policies.80
The pollution exclusion excludes "coverage for damages that arise
out of the discharge of irritants, contaminants, or pollutants into
the air, water or land, except when the discharge is sudden and
accidental.""' Courts in various jurisdictions have had difficulty in
applying the pollution exclusion to environmental clean-up claims
2
because of differing interpretations of the exclusion's language.
In United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Specialty Coatings
Co. ,"a the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District considered
whether an insurer has a duty to defend and indemnify for cleanup
costs when the pollution was caused by third parties and when the
comprehensive general liability policy contained a pollution exclusion.84 The court held that the pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous, and, as a result, the insured was obligated to provide
coverage.8 5
United States Fidelity and Guaranty (the "insurer") issued comprehensive general liability ("CGL") policies to Specialty Coatings
Company, a producer of industrial coatings, and to Specialty
Chemical Company, a manufacturer of sealants and adhesives (collectively, the "insureds"). 6 The insureds tendered to the insurer
the defense of three separate legal claims brought by governmental
77.

OSTRAGER AND NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES

§ 8.01 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter OSTRAGER & NEWMAN].
78. Id. A responsible party can be held strictly liable for clean-up costs without regard to whether that party caused or contributed to the pollution problem if that party
has either generated, transported, or exercised control over the hazardous waste. Id. Governmental suits seeking reimbursement for clean-up costs are regulatory, rather than suits
for "damages." Id. at § 8.03[c][2].
79. Id. at § 8.01.
80. 7A APPLEMAN, supra note 49, at § 4499.05.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 133
(1989).
84. Id. at 381, 535 N.E.2d at 1073.
85. Id. at 388, 535 N.E.2d at 1078.
86. Id. at 381, 535 N.E.2d at 1073.
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entities arising out of environmental pollution. 7
8
The insurer denied coverage based on its pollution argument,
declined to defend,8 9 and filed a declaratory judgment action
against the insureds. 90 The insurer argued that the pollution exclusion barred recovery for damages caused by a third party polluter.91 Aside from the pollution exclusion argument, the insurer
maintained that the policy required it to defend "suits" only, and
87. Id. The claims concerned alleged violations of State and federal environmental
statutes resulting from the delivery to a recycler of industrial waste for disposal. Id. The
recycler disposed of the waste by open dumping at its property. Id. Three separate claims
were filed-against the insureds, including:
(1) the Attorney General of Illinois sought injunctive relief, alleging that the
open dumping created a pollution hazard in violation of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11 I/2, paras. 1012, 1021 (1987);
(2) the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("USEPA") issued a
PRP (potentially responsible party) letter, notifying the insured that as a generator, it was potentially responsible for costs of cleaning up the waste disposal
site under CERCLA. The USEPA did not file a complaint, but scheduled a
meeting with the insured to discuss settlement; (3) a third-party action against
the insured concerning its contribution to chemical waste pollution of surface
and below-ground water and soil at industrial waste sites in Gary, Indiana.
Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 381-82, 535 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
88. The pollution exclusion provided, in pertinent part:
This insurance does not apply ... to bodily injury or property damage arising
out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Id. at 384, 535 N.E.2d at 1075.
89. The duty to defend language specified:
[T]he Company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the
Insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage,
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and
may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems
expedient, but the Company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the Company's liability
has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
Id. at 388-89, 535 N.E.2d at 1078.
90. Id. at 381, 535 N.E.2d at 1073. The insurer alleged that no "property damage"
had occurred, as defined by the policy. Id. at 382, 535 N.E.2d at 1074. The policy provided that "[t]his insurance does not apply... to property damage to... [p]roperty used
by the insured." Id. at 390, 535 N.E.2d at 1079.
91. Id. at 384-85, 535 N.E.2d at 1075-76. The insurer urged the court to interpret the
language "sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion as another division of the
First District Appellate Court had done the previous year. Id. at 386-87, 535 N.E.2d at
1076-77 (citing International Minerals and Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 Ill.
App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1st Dist. 1988), leave to appeal denied, 122 Ill. 2d 576, 530
N.E.2d 246 (1988). The InternationalMinerals court held that the pollution exclusion is
inapplicable only when the discharge was unintended and unexpected and when the resulting dispersal of pollutants occurred abruptly. InternationalMinerals, 168 Ill. App. 3d
at 375-76, 522 N.E.2d at 767-68. The InternationalMinerals court defined "accidental"
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that the potentially responsible party ("PRP") letter was not the
equivalent of a "suit. ' 92 Further, the insurer asserted that "damages" were legal damages only and did not include injunctive relief,
civil penalties, response costs or economic loss. 93 Finally, the insurer argued that the insureds had not been sued for property damage as defined by the policy.94 Based on the above reasons, the
insurer asserted that it was not required to provide coverage.95
The insureds countered that the exclusionary language was ambiguous and did not specify whether coverage is provided only when
the insureds actively caused the pollution. 96 The insureds maintained that rules of construction required all policy ambiguities to
be construed in their favor. 97
The trial court agreed with the insureds and held that the insurer was required to provide coverage. 98 The appellate court affirmed on several grounds. 99 First, the appellate court held that
the pollution exclusion was ambiguous and therefore did not apply,
regardless of whether the insureds were active polluters.' ° The
to mean the exclusion would not apply if the release of the pollution was unintended and
unexpected by the insured. Id.
92. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 388, 535 N.E.2d at 1078. One line of cases
has held that a PRP letter does not constitute a lawsuit. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987), reconsiderationdenied and summary judgment granted, 720 F. Supp. 597, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11512 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file) (a suit includes any effort to impose on the
policyholders a liability ultimately enforceable by a court). But see Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1188 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 1033 (1980)
(adjudicatory proceedings before an administrative body could trigger a suit and a corresponding duty to defend); Detrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F.
Supp. 438, 442-43, 446 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (issuance of a remedial order by the USEPA
would trigger the insurer's duty to defend).
93. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 390-91, 535 N.E.2d at 1079. The insurer
maintained that the statutory schemes pursuant to which injunctive relief, cleanup and
response costs were requested distinguish equitable relief from relief for pure property
damage. Id. at 393, 535 N.E.2d at 1081 (citing Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804
F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986)).
94. Id. at 392-93, 535 N.E.2d at 1081.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 384-85, 535 N.E.2d at 1075-76.
97. Id. at 386, 535 N.E.2d at 1076.
98. Id. at 383, 535 N.E.2d at 1074.
99. Id. at 381, 535 N.E.2d at 1073.
100. Id. at 385, 535 N.E.2d at 1076. The court reviewed the underwriting history of
the pollution exclusion and noted that the circumstances did not make clear whether the
pollution exclusion was intended to apply to third party polluters. Id. Additionally, the
court held that the pollution exclusion's "sudden and accidental" exception was a restatement of the definition of occurrence and should only serve to preclude coverage for damages which are expected and intended by the insured. Id. at 387-88, 535 N.E.2d at 107677. The court emphasized that the historical background of the pollution exclusion revealed that the insurance industry's underwriting intent was to clarify the definition of
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court construed the policy language ambiguities against the insurer. 10 1 The court emphasized that it would construe such ambiguities in light of the contract's main purpose, i.e., to provide
coverage to the insureds.l0 2 This is particularly true when ambiguities occur in an exclusion because insurers limit coverage through
0 3
exclusions.
Second, the court held that the insurer was obligated to defend
actions contemplated by a PRP letter."° The "property used" exclusion did not serve to deny coverage just because the insureds did
not own or conduct business on the contaminated property. 05 Finally, the appellate court held that the definition of "damages" was
ambiguous to the non-legal community. 06 Consequently, the term
occurrence and exclude expected and intended damages. Id. at 387, 535 N.E.2d at 1077
(citing Pendygraft, Plews, Clark and Wright, Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L.
REv. 117, 154 (1988)).
101. Id. at 388, 535 N.E.2d at 1078. The court rejected the definition of "sudden and
accidental" adopted in InternationalMinerals, 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1st
Dist. 1988); see supra note 91. Instead, the court held that the term "sudden and accidental" meant unexpected or unintended regardless of a specific period of time. Specialty
Coatings at 387, 535 N.E.2d at 1077. The court distinguished InternationalMinerals because the insured therein was charged with active polluting conduct; the insured in Specialty Coatings was not. Id. at 387, 535 N.E.2d at 1077.
102. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 384, 535 N.E.2d at 1075. A comprehensive general liability policy was especially susceptible to such a construction because its
purchaser presumably supposed it would provide broad coverages. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 389, 535 N.E.2d at 1079. The court recognized that the USEPA's decision
to seek first the insured's voluntary compliance did not eliminate the potential liability for
cleanup costs and damages to be incurred. Id. The insured undertook voluntarily the
same actions in responding to the PRP letter that it would have been required to undertake if the matter were in litigation. Id. See generally OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note
77, at § 8.04[c][1].
105. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 535 N.E.2d at 1079 (citing United
States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 590-91, 336 N.W.2d 838,
843-44 (1983); CPS Chemical Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 222 N.J. Super. 175, 189, 536
A.2d 311, 317-18 (1988) (pollution migrated through water table); Broadwell Realty
Servs. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 218 N.J. 516, 532, 528 A.2d 76, 82-83 (1987) (off-site
property damaged by release of gasoline); Caisson Corp. v. Home Indem. Corp., 151 111.
App. 3d 130, 135, 502 N.E.2d 1168 (1st Dist. 1986); Alderman v. Hanover Ins. Group,
169 Conn. 603, 605, 363 A.2d 1102, 1105 (1975) (portion of roof torn off, damaging
property incidental to insured property)). The court noted that the insured had not instructed the third-party, waste disposal company to use any specific method of disposal or
location for disposal. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 535 N.E.2d at 1079.
106. Id. at 391-92, 535 N.E.2d at 1080 (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 986 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
66 (1988)). Therefore, the court defined "damages" as "[t]he estimated reparation in
money for detriment or injury sustained; compensation or satisfaction imposed by law for
a wrong or injury caused by a violation of a legal right." Id. at 391-92, 535 N.E.2d at
1080 (citing WEBSTER'S
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was construed in the insureds' favor. 10 7
Specialty Coatings,the first Illinois case to interpret the pollution
exclusion as applied to third party or "innocent" polluters, is a
triumph for insureds seeking coverage for environmental pollution.
The court based its opinion on strong public policy considerations. 0 8 The court was unwilling to deny coverage to an insured
who was not an active polluter and whose only alleged connection
to the polluting was hiring another company to dispose of its
waste."°9 To that end, the court employed a strategy of relying on
extrinsic evidence to find ambiguity in every section of the policy in
order to allow coverage.
D. Failure to File with the Illinois Commerce Commission a
Certificate of Cancellationfor Expired Policy
In 1973, Illinois law required insurers of common carriers to file
proof of liability insurance coverage and certificates of cancellation
with the Illinois Commerce Commission. 110 The purpose of this
requirement was to protect the public from uninsured common
carriers." In Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Millers National
Insurance Co., the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District
considered whether an insurance company that did not file a required certificate of cancellation with the Illinois Commerce Commission for its expired policy must contribute to losses sustained by
1971)). The court further stated that it would be senseless to conclude that years of illegal
dumping of various pollutants resulting in soil and groundwater contamination did not
constitute injury to tangible property. Id. at 394, 535 N.E.2d at 1082.
107. Id. at 391, 535 N.E.2d at 1080.
108. For example, had the court ruled that PRP letters were not lawsuits, insureds
might be encouraged to refuse to cooperate with the USEPA in order to provoke litigation and to obtain insurance coverage. Id. at 389, 535 N.E.2d at 1079.
109. In contrast, the insured in InternationalMinerals, 168 111. App. 3d 361, 376, 522
N.E.2d 758, 768 (1st Dist. 1988), allegedly polluted by allowing toxic wastes from barrels
on its own land to escape into the surrounding land and water. The Specialty Coatings
court apparently was more inclined to find coverage for the "innocent" polluter, rather
than the InternationalMinerals "active" polluter. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d at
385, 535 N.E.2d at 1077.
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95'/, para. 18-701 (1973). Section 18-701(a) provides, in
pertinent part:
Security for the protection of the public
(a) No motor carrier of property shall operate any motor vehicle for which a
certificate or permit is required by this Chapter unless it has on file with the
Commission and in effect good and sufficient indemnity bonds or insurance policies ....

Id.
111. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Millers Nat'l Ins. Co., 178 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1017, 534
N.E.2d 151, 155 (4th Dist. 1989).
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the current liability insurer.1 1 2 The court held that an insurance
it did not
company was not obligated to contribute simply because
3
file a certificate of cancellation for a lapsed policy."
Millers National Insurance Company (the "first insurer") issued
a policy of Truckers Liability Insurance to Fairview Cartage, a
common carrier.' 14 In compliance with the statutory requirements, the first insurer filed an unsigned certificate of liability insurance with the Illinois Commerce Commission." 5 The first
insurer did not have any record demonstrating that the insured
had renewed the policy and did not receive a premium after the
policy's expiration date." 6 Eight years after the first insurer's policy expired, a vehicle leased to the previously insured common carrier was involved in a traffic accident." 7 At the time of the
accident, the insured common carrier had a liability insurance policy in effect with Country Mutual Insurance Company (the "second insurer")."' A person who had been injured in the accident
filed suit against the insured common carrier, and the second insurer undertook the defense.' 9
Once the second insurer learned of the first insurer's certificate
of insurance, it unsuccessfully tendered the defense to the first insurer. 20 Ultimately, the second insurer settled the suit against the
insured common carrier for $925,000. 121 Following the settlement,
the second insurer filed a complaint for declaratory judgment
against the first insurer. 22 The second insurer sought a declaration
that the first insurer's policy was still in effect because the first insurer failed to file a notice of cancellation with the Illinois Com112. Id. at 1013, 534 N.E.2d at 152.
113. Id. at 1017, 534 N.E.2d at 154-55.
114. Id. at 1014, 534 N.E.2d at 153. The policy was in effect from May 31, 1973 to
May 31, 1974. Id.
115. Id. The certificate contained details about the first insurer's policy. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1015, 534 N.E.2d at 153.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The first insurer declined the tender because its policy was not in effect. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The second insurer argued that the language in the certificate of insurance
required an insurer to file a notice of cancellation before a policy will actually be cancelled. Id.at 1015, 534 N.E.2d at 153-54. The second insurer further alleged because the
certificate of insurance on file with the Illinois Commerce Commission had not been cancelled, the first insurer's policy was still effective. Id. at 1015, 534 N.E.2d at 154. Therefore, the second insurer asserted that the first insurer was obligated to reimburse the
second insurer for the amount it had expended in defense costs and settlement of the
underlying action. Id.
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merce Commission.123 Thereafter, the first insurer ified a notice of
cancellation of its policy with the Illinois Commerce
Commission.124
The second insurer urged the court strictly to construe the statutory language.125 It argued that the first insurer's policy was still in
effect because the first insurer had not cancelled the certificate of
26
insurance on file with the Illinois Commerce Commission.
Therefore, the second insurer maintained that the first insurer
should reimburse it for the amount paid out in settlement of the
underlying litigation as well as for its reasonable defense fees and
expenses. 27 The first insurer countered that coverage could not
exist simply because it failed to fie a notice of cancellation with the
Illinois Commerce Commission.' 28 Further, the first insurer asserted that certificates of insurance do not create liability between
insurance carriers but serve only29to protect the public from the risk
of uninsured common carriers.
The trial court held that the second insurer had not shown that
the first insurer had ever fied the unsigned certificate of insurance
with the Illinois Commerce Commission.1 30 Moreover, even if the
second insurer established the first insurer had fied the certificate,
that filing alone would not grant the second insurer enforceable
contract rights.13 ' The court noted that the second insurer issued
its policy without relying on the first insurer's certificate of insurof cancellation could not
ance.' 32 Thus, the late filing of the notice
33
create liability between the carriers.
The appellate court affirmed and held that the first insurer was
not required to reimburse the second insurer merely because a certificate of insurance was on file with the Illinois Commerce Commission. 134 The court noted that although no one had filed a notice
of cancellation, the underlying policy had lapsed several years
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1017, 534 N.E.2d at 155 (citing National Indem. Co. v. Pennsylvania
Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 151 (Fla. Dist. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 461
(Fla. 1979)).
126. Id. at 1015, 534 N.E.2d at 153-54.
127. Id. at 1015, 534 N.E.2d at 154.
128. Id. at 1016, 534 N.E.2d at 154.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1017, 534 N.E.2d at 154-55.
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before the accident. 135 In contrast, the second insurer had an active policy with and had received premiums from the insured common carrier. 136 Moreover, the second insurer issued its policy
without relying on the uncancelled certificate. 137 The existence of a
did not give any contract rights to the seccertificate of insurance
8
ond insurer.13
Accordingly, the court held that the second insurer would receive an undeserved windfall if the court allowed the second insurer to avoid losses it knowingly undertook to insure.1 39 In
addition, the court stressed that one purpose of the certificate filing
requirement was to protect the public.140 Here, the public was protected because there was never any time when the carrier lacked
insurance.' 4
In Millers National, the court acknowledged that had the common carrier been uninsured at the time of the loss, the result in the
favor of the first insurer would likely have been different. However,
where the issue is contribution between insurers, the court will apply equitable principles to deny an undeserved windfall to the insurers who knowingly undertake to insure a risk without
knowledge of or reliance upon a lapsed policy.
III.

LIABILITY INSURANCE

A. Definition of "Occurrence"
In an occurrence policy, an insurer indemnifies its insured if the
negligent act or omitted act occurs within the policy period, regardless of the date of discovery. 142 The insurer determines the
amount of coverage available under such a policy based in large
part on the number of occurrences giving rise to an insured's liabil135. Id. at 1017, 534 N.E.2d at 155.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1017-18, 534 N.E.2d at 155-56 (citing Insurance Co. of North Am. v.
Morgan, 406 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Canal Ins. Co. v. Ins.
Co. of North Am., 424 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1982)).
139. Id. at 1017, 534 N.E.2d at 155.
140. Id. (citing Johnson v. R and D Enter., 106 Ill. App. 3d 496, 499, 435 N.E.2d
1233, 1234-35 (1st Dist. 1982); Illinois Casualty Co. v. Krol, 324 Ill. App. 478, 481-82, 58
N.E.2d 473, 475-76 (1st Dist. 1944)).
141. Id. at 1018, 534 N.E.2d at 155-56. Finally, the appellate court asserted that this
holding would not lessen the significance of the legislative purpose; rather, the holding
only resolved a controversy over which of two insurers should be liable for an insured's
losses. Id. at 1017, 534 N.E.2d at 155.
142. 6B APPLEMAN, supra note 49, at § 4262.
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ity.' 43 In general, one set of occurrence policy limits, and one deductible, applies to each occurrence if all applicable policy terms
and conditions are satisfied. 144 Thus, the appropriate definition of
"occurrence" is critical. In Mason v. Home Insurance Co.,145 the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District held that the term
"occurrence" in an insurance policy referred to the cause of damages, rather than the relatedness of the individual claims.'"
In Mason, the insured owned and operated a restaurant. 47 Over
a three-day period in 1983, patrons of the insured ate sandwiches
contaminated with botulinal toxin.1 48 The patrons showed signs of
botulism poisoning approximately eleven hours after consumption
of the tainted food. 149 The injured patrons subsequently filed suit
against the insured.' 50 At the time of the injuries, The Home Insurance Company of Illinois (the "primary insurer") provided the
insured with primary business owner's coverage.' 5 ' The primary
policy provided a $500,000 aggregate limit of liability. 52 Additionally, the insured had excess liability insurance coverage
through International Insurance Company (the "excess insurer"). 5 3 The excess policy provided that the limit of liability
coverage for each occurrence of personal injury liability, property
damage liability, and advertising liability was $1,000,000.'s4 Additionally, the excess policy established a $1,000,000 aggregate limit
55
for each annual period with respect to products hazard coverage.1
143. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 77, at § 704.
144. Id
145. 177 Ill. App. 3d 454, 532 N.E.2d 526 (3d Dist. 1988), leave to appeal denied, 125
Ill. 2d 567, 537 N.E.2d 811 (1989).
146. Id. at 461, 532 N.E.2d at 530.
147. Id. at 456, 532 N.E.2d at 527.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 462, 532 N.E.2d at 531.
150. Id. at 456, 532 N.E.2d at 527.
151. Id. at 456-57, 532 N.E.2d at 527. The primary policy was not at issue at the
appellate level. Id, at 457, 532 N.E.2d at 527.
152. Id, at 458, 532 N.E.2d at 528.
153. Id. at 457, 532 N.E.2d at 527. The excess policy was the only policy in question
at the appellate level. Id. at 457, 532 N.E.2d at 527. The excess policy defined "occurrence" as follows:
With respect to Coverage 1(a) and 1(b) 'occurrence' means either an accident or
happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which
unexpectedly and unintentionally causes injury to persons or tangible property
during the policy period. All damages arising out of such exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one
occurrence.
Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The excess policy defined "Products Hazard" as follows:
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As a result of a coverage dispute with both insurers over the limits
of liability, the injured patrons filed a declaratory judgment action
to determine the amount of available coverage.1 56
The patrons argued that each sale and consumption of botulismtainted food constituted a separate occurrence under the policy
terms.1- 7 Therefore, the patrons asserted that they were each entitled to up to $1,000,000 for injuries sustained. l M The patrons also
argued that the aggregate limitation of the products hazard provision did not apply because the occurrence did not take place away
from the premises. '" Rather, the patrons maintained that they
suffered personal injuries on the premises at the moment that each
of them consumed contaminated food items.' 6° The insurers, on
the other hand, maintained that the various incidents of food
poisoning constituted a single occurrence.' 6 Thus, regardless of
the number of patrons injured, coverage was limited to
$1,000,000.162 According to the insurers, the occurrence that gave
rise to all the claims was the method in which the insured prepared
the food.' 63 The insurers asserted that there was only one occurrence because all the patrons allegedly suffered injuries through exposure to the same conditions.M
Additionally, the excess insurer argued that the products hazard
limitation applied and sought to limit recovery to the annual aggregate of $1,000,000, irrespective of the number of occurrences.1 65
The insured contended that it would be sheer speculation to conclude that the injuries occurred when the patrons ate the food at
'[pl]roducts hazard' means (a) the handling or use of or the existence of any
condition in or a warranty of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or
distributed by the named insured or by others trading under its name, if the
occurrence happens after possession of such goods or products has been relinquished to others by the named insured or by others trading under its name and
if such occurrence happens away from the premises owned by, rented to or
controlled by the named insured ....
Id.
156. Id. at 456, 532 N.E.2d at 527.
157. Id. at 457-58, 532 N.E.2d at 527-28.
158. Id. at 458, 532 N.E.2d at 528.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 459, 532 N.E.2d at 528. The patrons asserted that the language of the
policy did not require a determination that all claims arose out of the same occurrence.
Id at 459, 532 N.E.2d at 529. They argued that there was "no continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions" contained in the policy's definition of "occurrence." Id.
161. Id. at 458, 532 N.E.2d at 528.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 459, 532 N.E.2d at 528.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 462, 532 N.E.2d at 530.
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the insured's restaurant, because medical documents showed that
the patrons did not exhibit symptoms of botulism poisoning until
at least eleven hours after eating the tainted food. 16" Accordingly,
the insured argued that the patrons became ill away from the
premises and that the products hazard provision applied. 67
Under one approach, the court determines the number of occurrences by referring to the cause or causes of damage, rather than to
the number of individual claims or injuries.1 6 In deciding the declaratory judgment action, the trial court employed a cause approach to define "occurrence." ' 69 The court held that all of the
patrons' claims constituted a single occurrence.1 70 The trial court
also held that all of the patrons' claims fell within the products
hazards provision of the policies.1 71 On these bases, the trial court
granted summary judgment for the insurers and denied the pa1 72
trons' cross-motion for summary judgment.
The patrons appealed against the excess insurer only. 173 The appellate court reversed and held that the patrons' claims did not
arise out of a single occurrence.174 Instead, the insured's service of
separate portions of tainted food to individual patrons resulted in
multiple occurrences under the policy's definition.'17 The insured
could not be liable until it served the tainted food, which consti166. Id. at 462, 532 N.E.2d at 531.
167. Id
168. Id at 459-60, 532 N.E.2d at 529 (citing Michigan Chemical Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1984)).
169. Id at 458, 532 N.E.2d at 528. The trial court determined that the cause of the
injuries was the improper preparation of tainted food. Id. at 460, 532 N.E.2d at 528. As a
result, the liability section of the primary policy restricted recovery to $500,000 and the
liability section of the excess policy restricted recovery to $1,000,000 for all claims. Id at
458, 532 N.E.2d at 528.
170. Id.
171. Id. For this reason as well, total coverage was limited to $500,000 in the primary
policy and $1,000,000 in the excess policy. Id
172. Id
173. Id The patrons did not contest the trial court's ruling that the primary policy
limited coverage to $500,000. Id.
174. Id. at 459, 532 N.E.2d at 529. According to the appellate court, the circumstances did not present one continuous cause, but several separate acts. Each time the
restaurant provided contaminated food to a different customer, additional exposure was
created, constituting a separate occurrence. Id The court analogized Mason to Michigan
Chem. Corp. v. Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1984). In Michigan Chemical Corp., an insured accidentally shipped flame retardants in bags that were identical to
livestock feed bags. Id. at 376. Over 40,000 animals had to be destroyed after they had
consumed the flame retardant. Id. The court of appeals held that each shipment constituted a distinct act from which liability arose. Id at 383.
175. Mason, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 461, 532 N.E.2d at 530.
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tuted the act from which liability arose.1 76 Further, the court concluded that the patrons sustained bodily injury when they ate the
contaminated food, rather than when they exhibited symptoms of
botulism poisoning.17 7 Thus, the appellate court held that the
products hazard aggregate did not apply because that aggregate
applied only when the occurrence happened away from the insured's premises."7 "
In Mason, the court acted to maximize insurance coverage in an
effort to guarantee that injured parties would recover for their
losses. Although it is unknown whether other districts will follow
the Third District's lead, courts may apply Mason to the environmental and toxic tort insurance cases now proliferating in the Illinois judicial system. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately will be
forced to address this significant coverage issue as conflicting opinions from other appellate districts are likely.
R

Claims Made Requirements

Under a "claims made" policy, an insurer must indemnify an
insured for only those claims asserted within the policy period.17 9
Although the insurance industry has attempted to use plain English in its insurance policies to clearly communicate the terms of
insurance policies to consumers, insurers have had difficulty in
simplifying policy language, as was evident in St. Paul Insurance
Company v. Armas.1 80 In Armas, the court held that it would consider the various terms and endorsements of the policy with other
documents relating to coverage to determine the meaning of when
a claim is made. 81 Because several of the documents conflicted in
176. Id
177. Id. at 463, 532 N.E.2d at 531. The parties agreed that for the purposes of the
products hazard provision, "occurrence" referred to the suffering of bodily injury. Id at
462, 532 N.E.2d at 530. The Mason court analogized to the decision of Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Raymark Indus., 118 Ill. 2d 23, 514 N.E.2d 150 (1987). In Raymark, the Illinois
Supreme Court determined that bodily injury occurs when asbestos fibers are inhaled and
retained in the lung, rather than when asbestosis is detected. Id. at 45, 514 N.E.2d at
161.
178. Mason, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 463, 532 N.E.2d at 531.
179. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 77, at § 402[b][4]. Under a standard claims
made policy, a claim is made when suit is filed against the insured. A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 1.07 (2d ed. 1988). On the other hand, some policies
provide that a claim is not made until notice of the lawsuit is given to the insurance
company. Id An insured's failure to provide notice of the claim to an insurer within the
policy period can result in a loss of coverage. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 77, at
§ 4.02[b][4).
180. 173 Ill. App. 3d 669, 527 N.E.2d 921 (1st Dist. 1988).
181. Id. at 674-75, 527 N.E.2d at 924.
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their interpretation of when a claim is made, the court could not
construe the resulting ambiguities in favor of either party and remanded the case for further proceedings.' 82
The case arose in January 1985, when St. Paul Insurance Company ("the insurer") issued a physician's professional liability
claims made policy to an insured, which was purportedly written
in plain English.1 3 The insured cancelled the professional liability
coverage approximately eight months later.8 4 Although the insured's agent corresponded with him and offered to sell extended
coverage on three separate occasions, the insured did not purchase
such coverage, and termination of the policy was effective as of
October 1, 1985.181
182. Id. at 676, 527 N.E.2d at 925.
183. Id. at 670-71, 527 N.E.2d at 922-23. The policy was effective from January 15,
1985 to January 15, 1986, and had a retroactive date of January 15, 1983. Id. at 671, 527
N.E.2d at 922. The professional liability policy made reference to several provisions concerning when a claim is made:
When you're covered
To be covered the professional service must have been performed (or should
have been performed) after your retroactive date that applies. The claim must
also first be made while this agreement is in effect.
When is a claim made?
A claim is made on the date you first report an incident or injury to us or our
agent ....
Id. at 673, 527 N.E.2d at 923. The policy also contained provisions concerning when a
claim should be reported to the insurer:
WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE A LOSS
Someone is Injured or Something Happens Which Can Result in A Liability
Claim
If there's an accident or incident covered under this policy you.., must:
Tell us or our agent what happened as soon as possible. Do this even though no
claim has been made but you . . [are] aware of having done something that
may later result in a claim.
Id. Additionally, the policy had an optional reporting endorsement provision which, if
purchased, would provide coverage for a specified period of time after cancellation or
nonrenewal of the policy:
Optional reporting endorsement
Your professional coverage may end because one of us chooses to cancel or not
renew it. If this happens, you have the right to buy an optional extension of
coverage. It's called a reporting endorsement.
This reporting endorsement will cover:...
Claims that are first made or reported to us after the ending date of this agreement and before the reporting endorsement ends.
Id. at 675, 527 N.E.2d at 925. The policy, however, did not contain a definition section.
"Loss" was not defined anywhere in the policy. Id. at 673, 527 N.E.2d at 923-24.
184. Id. at 671, 527 N.E.2d at 922.
185. Id. The insured signed a cancellation form that provided, in pertinent part: "No
claims of any type will be made against the Insurance Company under the policy for
losses which occur after the date of cancellation shown above." Id. at 674, 527 N.E.2d at
924.
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A third party filed a medical malpractice suit against the insured
on August 7, 1985, while the policy was in effect.' 86 The malpractice plaintiff, however, did not serve the insured until March 31,
1986.187 On April 16, 1986, the insured reported the suit to his
agent. 188 The insurer declined coverage because the insured had
not reported the claim during the policy period. 89 The insurer
then filed a declaratory judgment suit against insured and the medical malpractice plaintiff and requested that the court determine
the rights and liabilities of the parties. 190
The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that the insurer owed no duty to defend or indemnify the insured in the medical malpractice litigation.' 9 ' The insured
appealed and argued that conflicting policy language, either standing alone or read together with the cancellation form and correspondence with his agent, created an ambiguity as to when a claim
is made under the terms of the insurance policy. 92 The insurer
countered that the court should disregard the language of the cancellation form and correspondence between the insured and his
agent and limit its interpretation of the insurance policy to the policy's four corners. 193 The appellate court held that the policy contained ambiguities concerning when a claim is made and when an
insured must report the claim to the insurer. 94 Therefore, it reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further
proceedings.' 95 The court reasoned that when an insurance contract consists of a policy and other documents executed as part of
one transaction and accompanying the policy or incorporated by
reference, the court must interpret the documents together to determine the meaning and effect of the contract. 196 The court
186. Id. at 671, 527 N.E.2d at 922.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 671-72, 527 N.E.2d at 922-23.
191. Id. at 672, 527 N.E.2d at 923.
192. Id. at 673, 527 N.E.2d at 923.
193. Id. at 674, 527 N.E.2d at 924 (citing Susmano v. Associated Internists of Chicago, 97 Il1. App. 3d 215, 219, 422 N.E.2d 879, 882 (1st Dist. 1981)). The insurer also
asserted that the language contained in the optional reporting endorsement applied to
insurance coverage distinct from the policy. Id. at 675, 527 N.E.2d at 925. Therefore, the
insurer argued that the language describing the endorsement should not be construed
together with other conditions of the policy. Id.
194. Id. at 676, 527 N.E.2d at 925.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 674, 527 N.E.2d at 924 (citing J. M. Corbett & Co. v. Insurance Co. of
North Am., 43 Ill. App. 3d 624, 357 N.E.2d 125 (1st Dist. 1976) (court will construe
certificate of insurance and riders to policy together to determine meaning and effect of

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 21

praised the efforts of some insurance companies that attempt to
write their policies in plain English. 197 Despite these efforts, however, the court recognized that the ability to draft a policy in clear
language is a deceptively complex undertaking.' 98
Although it is appropriate for insurers to simplify their policy
drafting, they should painstakingly undertake such drafting to assure consistency in the terms, conditions and exclusions in the policy documents. Insurers must carefully compare their marketing
materials and other correspondence to prevent the result in Armas.
The case puts insurers on notice that the courts may look to all
documents provided to an insured concerning coverage, including
extraneous marketing correspondence, when interpreting a policy's
terms and conditions.
C. Excess Carrier'sLiabilityfor Post-JudgmentInterest
Insurers are regularly involved in disputes with each other over
their respective responsibilities for all or a part of judgments in
excess of the primary insurance limits.'99 The insurers often argue
over whether the insured was afforded a proper defense, whether
the primary insurer properly handled the claim, or whether the
primary insurer reasonably could have settled the matter prior to
the judgment for an amount within its policy's limits. In this Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District addressed whether the primary or excess insurer is responsible for
insurance contract); Hoffman v. Central Sur. and Ins. Corp., 297 Ill. App. 371, 374, 17
N.E.2d 619 (4th Dist. 1938) (contract of insurance may consist of policy and other documents incorporated by reference, and the court will construe them together). Although
the cancellation form and the policy were not executed concurrently, the cancellation
form identified the insured's policy number. Arnas, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 675, 527 N.E.2d
at 924. Therefore, the cancellation form was incorporated by reference into the policy. Id
See Handal v. American Farmers Mut. Casualty Co., 79 Wis. 2d 67, 255 N.W.2d 903,
907 (1977). Moreover, the court held that the Optional Reporting Endorsement clause's
language differed from other policy provisions concerning when a claim is made, thereby
creating an ambiguity. Armas, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 676, 527 N.E.2d at 925. The word "or"
in the phrase "made or reported to us" in the Optional Reporting Endorsement indicated
that two events, not one, triggered the insurer's obligations under the policy. Id. (citing
Thornton v. Illinois Founders Ins. Co., 84 Il. 2d 365, 371, 418 N.E.2d 744 (1981)).
197. Armas, 173 II. App. 3d at 676, 527 N.E.2d at 925.
198. Id.
199. Excess insurance is issued in the insurance industry with the expectation that
the primary carrier will conduct the investigation, negotiation and defense of claims until
its limits are exhausted. 7C APPLEMAN, supra note 49, at § 4682. An excess insurer is not
liable for any part of the loss or damage which is covered by primary insurance; it is liable
only for the amount of loss or damage in excess of the coverage provided by the primary
policy or policies. 16 COUCH, supra note 13, at § 62:48. An insurer's excess policy may
provide that its liability does not begin until the primary policy limits are exhausted. Id

1990]

Insurance Law

469

post-judgment interest accruing on that portion of the underlying
2
judgment that exceeded the primary policy's limit of liability. 00
In HartfordAccident and Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co.,
the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that primary
insurance companies, not excess insurers, are responsible for postjudgment interest, unless a primary policy explicitly provides
otherwise. 0" In Hartford, the primary insurer provided its insured, a cartage company, with automobile liability coverage in the
amount of $1,000,000.202 Under the terms of its policy, the primary insurer provided that it would pay all interest that accrued
20 3
after the entry of a judgment, in addition to its liability limits.
The primary carrier's obligation to pay interest would end when it
had paid or tendered its policy limits. 2°4 The excess insurer provided excess automobile liability insurance for the same period. °5
Under the terms of the excess policy, the excess insurer stated that
it would pay all interest that accrued after the entry of judgment
until it had paid the limit of its liability. 2° 6
A third party died in an automobile accident in which the insured was involved.2 ' 7 Subsequently, the family of the decedent
filed a wrongful death suit against the insured. 208 A jury ultimately
rendered a verdict against the insured in the wrongful death action. 20 9 The judgment exhausted the primary policy limit and triggered the excess coverage. 210 Both the insured and the decedent's
family cross-appealed the judgment.21 ' While the appeal was pending, the primary carrier entered into a partial settlement-partial
satisfaction of judgment with the underlying plaintiff. 212 The excess insurer also entered into a partial satisfaction with the underlying plaintiff.21 3 The excess insurer subsequently filed a complaint
200. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 665, 527
N.E.2d 950 (1st Dist. 1988), aff'd, 132 Ill. 2d 79, 547 N.E.2d 114 (1989).
201. Id. at 668, 527 N.E.2d at 953.
202. Id. at 667, 527 N.E.2d at 951.
203. Id. at 667, 527 N.E.2d at 952.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 666, 527 N.E.2d at 951.
206. Id. at 668, 527 N.E.2d at 952.
207. Id. at 666, 527 N.E.2d at 951.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. The primary carrier paid the underlying plaintiff $1,191,667, representing its
policy limit plus accrued interest and minus the settlement discount. Id.
213. Id. The excess insurer paid $500,000, which was the amount of the judgment
exceeding the primary policy, excluding accrued post-judgment interest. Id.

470
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against the primary carrier seeking a declaratory judgment on the
issue of which insurer was responsible for the post-judgment interest.2' 1 4 The excess insurer argued that the primary carrier should
cover all post-judgment interest on that part of the judgment in
excess of the primary insurer's limits of liability.2 1
In resolving the declaratory judgment action, the trial court held
that the primary insurer was relieved of the liability for all postjudgment interest because the insured had purchased excess coverage, which also provided for post-judgment interest. 216 Thus, the
trial court ordered the excess carrier to pay its pro rata portion of
the interest.217 On appeal by the excess carrier, the first district
reversed, holding that the primary carrier must pay the post-judgment interest unless the primary policy explicitly apportioned the
liability.218 The appellate court determined that provisions of the
primary policy explicitly relieved the excess insurer from liability
for post-judgment interest.21 9 Under the terms of its policy, the
primary carrier undertook to pay all interest accruing after the entry of judgment.22 ° Moreover, the primary policy did not contain
any limitations in the event that excess insurance might apply.2 2 1
The Hartford decision turns upon the primary policy's language
regarding payment of interest on judgments by the insurer. Its application will be limited to cases involving similar policy provisions. The opinion also suggests that the primary insurer could
have prevented the Hartford result by making certain drafting
changes in the provisions. The court emphasized that both companies were sophisticated insurers writing both excess and primary
coverage. 22222 Those drafting policy language should be careful to
specify a pro rata sharing of interest between primary and excess
insurers in order to carry out the underwriting intent.
IV.

HEALTH INSURANCE: ASSIGNMENT OF

HMO BENEFITS

Under Illinois law, beneficiaries of health maintenance organiza214. Id. The excess insurer argued that it was not liable for post-judgment interest
that accrued on the portion of the underlying judgment for which it provided excess
coverage. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 666-67, 527 N.E.2d at 952.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 668, 527 N.E.2d at 953.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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tions ("HMOs") 223 can sue the HMOs if the insurers unreasonably
or vexatiously delay payment of a claim. 2 4 However, the statute
governing unreasonable or vexatious delay does not address
whether such a cause of action can be assigned by the HMO
enrollee.225
In Loyola University Medical Center v. Med Care HMO, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that a health care
provider who takes a valid assignment of benefits from an enrollee
has standing to maintain a claim for damages if the HMO is found
liable for unreasonable and vexatious delay in remitting the payment due to the assignee. 26
In Loyola University, an enrollee's premature newborn infant required treatment by a nonmember health care provider ("nonmember provider") because no member health care providers had the
necessary facilities. 2 7 The HMO confirmed the infant's eligibility
223. A health maintenance organization is defined in Illinois law as "any organization formed under the laws of this or another state to provide or arrange for one or more
health care plans under a system which causes any part of the risk of health care delivery
to be borne by the organization or its providers." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para.
1402(9) (1987). An enrollee of a health maintenance organization (an "HMO") must
obtain medical services from one of a group of physicians and hospitals ("health care
providers") who are under contract with the HMO. Loyola Univ. Medical Center v. Med
Care HMO, 180 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473 n.1, 535 N.E.2d 1125, 1126 n.1 (1st Dist. 1989).
The HMO pays the health care provider for those medical services and the health care
provider has no right of recourse against the enrollee. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 /2,
para. 1407.01 (1987). If an enrollee seeks treatment outside of the plan, as in an emergency where there are no available HMO health care providers, the HMO usually must
pay that nonmember health care provider, subject to subscription certificate conditions.
Loyola Univ. 180 Ill. App. 3d at 473 n.1, 535 N.E.2d at 1126 n.1. State law requires
HMOs to provide health care coverage to newborn infants, including treatment for illness, injury, congenital defects, birth abnormalities and premature birth. Id. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch 1111/2, para. 1409.1(2) (1987).
224. Id. para. 1409A.
225. Loyola Univ., 180 Ill. App. 3d at 481, 535 N.E.2d at 1131-32.
226. Id. at 482, 535 N.E.2d at 1132.
227. Id. at 473, 535 N.E.2d at 1126. During the course of admission, the insured
executed a form entitled "Admitting Authorization Record." The "Admitting Authorization Record" provided:
Payment Guarantee/Assignment of Insurance Benefits. For and in consideration of hospital care to the above patient, I/we agree to pay the established rates
of [the health care provider] and its physicians for all services, facilities, and
supplies rendered hereunder. I hereby authorize insurance payment(s) to be
made directly to the physician or physicians of the [health care provider] involved in the patient's care and to the hospital for services rendered, but the
hospital payment shall not exceed the hospital's regular charge for this period of
hospitalization. I understand that I am financially responsible for all hospital
and physician charges not covered by my insurance plan.
Id. at 473-74, 535 N.E.2d at 1126-27.
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for coverage and quoted the insured benefits.228 A nonmember
provider treated the infant. 229 Further, the nonmember provider
produced monthly interim billings, which it sent to the HMO, and
forwarded a final summation of itemized charges of $121,486.55 at
the conclusion of the treatment. 230 The HMO paid only
$27,384.53 and refused to pay the balance.23 '
The nonmember provider brought suit against the HMO to recover the outstanding balance.232 According to the nonmember
provider, the HMO had vexatiously and unreasonably denied payment of the balance in violation of Illinois law,233 thereby entitling
the nonmember provider to attorney fees and exemplary damages. 234 The nonmember provider asserted its status as an assignee
of all the enrollee's rights and benefits, 235 and it contended that the
assignment gave it standing to assert the claim.236 Further, the
nonmember provider argued that once an insured incurs a loss, the
nonassignability language does not bar assignments of the right to
payment. 237 The nonmember provider urged that the medical condition or injury requiring treatment is the "loss. ' 23s Moreover, the
nonmember provider contended that the enrollee can transfer the
right to payment or reimbursement for that loss because it is a
chose in action.239
The HMO responded by filing a motion to dismiss, asserting that
the nonmember provider did not have standing to raise a section
155 claim because only an enrollee can make such a claim. 240 The
HMO also argued that the assignment by the enrollee to the nonmember provider was void because the HMO's general policy required advance written approval before assignment of policy
benefits. 241 Further, the HMO stated that only an enrollee is enti228. Id. at 474, 535 N.E.2d at 1127.
229. Id. The nonmember provider also participated in certain quality review procedures required by law. Id.
230. Id
231. Id.
232. Id. at 472-73, 535 N.E.2d at 1126.
233. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 767 (1987).
234. Loyola Univ., 180 Ill. App. 3d at 473, 535 N.E.2d at 1126.
235. Id. at 475, 535 N.E.2d at 1127.
236. Id
237. Id at 477, 535 N.E.2d at 1129.
238. Id
239. Id
240. Id. at 473, 535 N.E.2d at 1126.
241. Id. at 474, 535 N.E.2d at 1127. In support, the HMO cited the "[HMO] Subscription Certificate for Medicaid Recipients of the State of Illinois," which stated in
pertinent part, "[n]o interest in the Group Service Agreement, in this Certificate, or in

1990]

Insurance Law

tied to any benefit under the certificate.242 According to the HMO,
it included the nonassignability clause in its policy to prevent the
transfer of benefits that are personal to the enrollee. 243 Therefore,
if an enrollee were permitted to assign the benefits to a third party
before a loss is incurred, the enrollee would alter the risk underwritten by the HMO. 244 The trial court denied the HMO's motion
to dismiss the section 155 claim but certified three questions for
interlocutory review. 245 The appellate court granted a permissive
interlocutory appeal, 2 " and the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision.247
The court held that a health care provider who takes an assignment of benefits from an assembly enrollee has standing to maintain a claim for damages from the HMO, including damages for
unreasonable and vexatious delay in payment. 24 The court stated

that an enrollee's assignee succeeds to the same position as the enrollee and is not a true third party.249 Other courts have held that
section 155 claims are transferable under a general assignment of
any Identification Card issued pursuant thereto is assignable without prior written consent of [the HMO]" Id. at 476, 535 N.E.2d at 1128.
242. Id. at 476-77, 535 N.E.2d at 1127.
243. Id. at 477, 535 N.E.2d at 1128.
244. Id. at 477, 535 N.E.2d at 1128-29. "Loss" was not defined in the HMO's certificate. Id. at 477 n.2, 535 N.E.2d at 1129 n.2. The HMO argued that the insured's loss is
the actual rendering of medical services. Id.
245. Id. at 473, 535 N.E.2d at 1127. The certified questions were:
(1) Whether the language contained in [the health care provider's] "Payment
Guarantee/Assignment of Insurance Benefits" is sufficiently unambiguous, as a
matter of law, to constitute a valid assignment of all contractual rights to reimbursement for those services rendered by [the health care provider] to [the insured's infant] during the entire course of [the insured's infant's] admission,
absent any other contradictory evidence regarding [the insured's] intent to assign benefits.
(2) Whether [the insured's] execution of the assignment of benefits prior to
the point where [the health care provider] had completed its course of treatment
constitutes the transfer of a right to payment when a loss under the policy is
imminently to be incurred, is not prevented by [the HMO's] general policy provision prohibiting an insured's assignment of benefits before a loss has occurred.
(3) Whether [the health care provider's] status as an assignee of [the insured's] subscription certificate benefits entitles it to assert a claim against [the
HMO], pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. (1985) ch. 73, § 767, for the damages
sustained from [the HMO's] alleged vexatious and unreasonable failure to settle
[the health care provider's] claim for services rendered to [the insured's infant].
Id. at 474-75, 535 N.E.2d at 1127.
246. Id. at 472-73, 535 N.E.2d at 1126.
247. Id. at 482, 535 N.E.2d at 1132. The appellate court remanded the case to the
trial court.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 480, 535 N.E.2d at 1131.
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benefits. 25 0 According to the appellate court, the HMO could not
limit its statutory liability by calling the assignee a third party. 251
Therefore, the nonmember health care provider had standing to
bring a claim under section 155.252
In addition, the court held that the enrollee must evidence her
intention to transfer to the nonmember provider all of the enrollee's rights to reimbursement under the policy for covered services.253 The nonmember provider's continuing course of treatment
was an ongoing performance of the consideration it gave for the
execution of the assignment. 254 The appellate court reasoned that
absent evidence of a contradictory intention, the words of the Admitting Authorization Record 255 operated as a full assignment of
the right to reimbursement. 256 Here, the enrollee assigned her
present conditional right to the insurance proceeds. 2 7 A valid assignment of a conditional right is enforceable in equity; 258 therefore, the assignment attaches to the balance under an existing
contract as it becomes due and payable to the assignor.259
The impact of Loyola University remains to be seen. Permitting
bona fide assignees the right to payment under section 155, however, should serve to expedite payment by insurers to health care
providers. In addition, the recognition of the assignability of rights
under health care benefits contracts, despite contrary policy language, strengthens the provider's hand in insurance collection
disputes.
V.

THE PRIORITY STATUS OF SHAREHOLDERS IN THE
LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGS OF INSOLVENT
INSURANCE COMPANIES

When insurance companies become insolvent or bankrupt, State
250. Id. at 479, 535 N.E.2d at 1130. See McHenry Hosp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 578 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Il. 1983) (courts should encourage assignments that provide
mechanisms for direct payment to health care providers); Aabye v. Security-Connecticut
Life Ins. Co., 586 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (assignee permitted to sue insurer under
section 155).
251. Loyola Univ., 180 Ill. App. 3d at 481, 535 N.E.2d at 1131.
252. Id. at 481, 535 N.E.2d at 1132.
253. Id. at 475, 535 N.E.2d at 1128.
254. Id. at 478, 535 N.E.2d at 1129.
255. See supra note 227 (text of the Admitting Authorization Record).
256. Loyola Univ., 180 II. App. 3d at 475, 535 N.E.2d at 1128.
257. Id. at 478, 535 N.E.2d at 1129 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs
§ 321, comment a (1981)).
258. Id.
259. Id. (See S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 412, at 34-35 (3d ed. 1960)).
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law governs the priority of claims against the companies. 2 ' The
Illinois liquidation statute provides that shareholders of insolvent
insurance companies have the lowest priority in the distribution
scheme.26 In the case of In re Liquidation of Security Casualty
Co.,262 the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether defrauded
shareholders could take assets out of the order provided by Illinois'
statutory scheme for liquidated companies under the Insurance
Code.263 The court held that they could not.2
In Security Casualty, the Illinois Department of Insurance informed Security Mutual Casualty Company ("Security Mutual")
that it would face sanctions and could be liquidated, if it failed to
increase its capital by year's end. 265 The directors of Security Mutual converted the company to stock ownership in order to raise
the needed capital. 266 Five months later, the Securities and Exchange Commission halted trading in Security America stock. 67
260. See generally 2A COUCH, supra note 13, at § 22:52 (explaining the general scope
of such statutes and the state interests involved).
261. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 817 (1987). Section 205 of the Insurance Code
provides, in pertinent part:
(1) The priorities of distribution of general assets from the company's estate is
to be as follows: (a) The costs and expenses of administration, including the
expenses of the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund... (b) Wages actually owing
to employees for services rendered within three months prior to the date of the
filing of the delinquency petition ... (c) Claims by policyholders, beneficiaries,
insureds and liability claims against insureds covered under insurance policies
and insurance contracts issued by the company . . . (d) All other claims of
general creditors not falling within any other priority under this Section ... (e)
Claims of guarantee fund certificate holders, guarantee capital shareholders and
surplus note holders. (f) Proprietaryclaims of shareholders,members or other
owners.
Id. (emphasis added).
262. 127 Ill. 2d 434, 537 N.E.2d 775 (1989).
263. Id. at 436, 537 N.E.2d at 776. The state has an important and vital interest in
the liquidation or reorganization of insurance companies. 19A APPLEMAN, supra note 49,
at § 10621. State legislatures have implemented Acts that permit their Departments of
Insurance to liquidate the affairs of insolvent insurance companies. Id. These Acts also
benefit and protect the public against a willful default or misconduct of anoinsurance
company. Id.
264. Security Casualty Co., 127 Ill. 2d at 442, 537 N.E.2d at 779.
265. Id. at 437, 537 N.E.2d at 777.
266. Id. Under the plan, Security Mutual changed its name to Security Casualty
Company. Id. A holding company, Security America Corporation, was formed to sell
stock and to purchase all the Security Casualty shares. Id. Security America transferred
the net proceeds of the public offering, approximately $14,200,000, to Security Casualty
in exchange for all the shares of Security Casualty's stock. Id. Both Security Casualty and
Security America were controlled by the same management, and Security America did
not have any business activities aside from its ownership of Security Casualty. Id. at 43738, 537 N.E.2d at 777.
267. Id. at 438, 537 N.E.2d at 777.
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In the following months, Security America shareholders filed a
number of suits, alleging that the company had defrauded them in
the sale of Security America stock.26 In addition, the Illinois Director of Insurance filed suit seeking the liquidation or rehabilitation of Security Casualty; the suit alleged that Security Casualty
was insolvent and had a negative net worth of $20,000,000.269 Finally, after a circuit court determined that Security Casualty was
actually insolvent, the court entered an order of liquidation that
authorized the Director of Insurance to liquidate Security
Casualty. 270
The shareholders moved to intervene in the Security Casualty
liquidation proceedings. 271 They wanted the court to impose a
constructive trust on the proceeds of the Security America stock
offering.272 Numerous parties, including the Director of Insurance
(in his capacity as liquidator of Security Casualty), argued that a
constructive trust should not be imposed because the statute provided a comprehensive and exclusive distribution scheme. 3 The
circuit court held for the shareholders and imposed a constructive
trust on almost $8,000,000 of the Security Casualty estate.274 The
court reasoned that the shareholders' funds were identifiable and
had come first into Security Casualty's possession through federal
securities law violations and then into the Director's possession, as
liquidator.27' The circuit judge ruled that Security Casualty never
acquired equitable title to the funds. Because a constructive trust is
created as the impropriety occurs, the funds thus fell outside the
statutory distribution scheme of section 205.276 In effect, the cir268. Id. These suits were consolidated in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (the "federal action"). Id. Through the federal action, the
Security America shareholders had established the violations of securities laws by Security America and its directors in connection with a public offering and sale of Security
America stock. Id. at 438-39, 537 N.E.2d at 777-78.
269. Id. at 438, 537 N.E.2d at 777.
270. Id
271. Id. at 439, 537 N.E.2d at 778.
272. Id. The shareholders argued that the proceeds of the stock offering should not be
considered general assets for the purposes of section 205 of the Insurance Code. Id. Further, the shareholders asserted that the existence of federal securities laws relief, also
found in Illinois securities law, implied that the legislature intended to allow securities
recoveries to go forward regardless of the priorities expressed in section 205(1). Id at
449-51, 537 N.E.2d at 783.
273. Id. at 441-42, 537 N.E.2d at 779. These parties maintained that other forms of
relief incompatible with the statute's provisions, such as the constructive trust, were not
available in insurance liquidation proceedings. Id. at 442, 537 N.E.2d at 779.
274. Id. at 441, 537 N.E.2d at 778-79.
275. Id. at 441, 537 N.E.2d at 779.
276. Id.
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cuit court's decision advanced the shareholders' claims ahead of all
others.277
On direct appeal,278 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding
that under Illinois' statutory scheme, the constructive trust could
not be imposed for the shareholders' benefit. 9 In so holding, the
court looked to the legislative intent of the statutory scheme, which
was to distribute an insolvent insurer's general assets on an equitable priority basis. 2 0 After considering the legislative intent of section 205(1), the court concluded that the legislature had not
contemplated any other forms of relief inconsistent with the priorities of the section.28 1 The court stressed that although both investors and lenders expose themselves to business insolvency risks,
only investors are deemed to assume the extra risk of illegal or
fraudulent issuance of securities.282 Consequently, by imposing a
constructive trust, the court would have shifted the risk of illegally
or fraudulently issued securities from investors, where the risk
properly lies, to those who chose not to expose themselves to the
potential burdens and benefits of owning stock.283
The Security Casualty decision illustrates the rigidity of the comprehensive and exclusive distribution scheme provided by the Insurance Code. Security Casualty appears to be a straightforward
application of the Illinois statutory scheme for distribution of an
insolvent insurer's general assets. Creditors, shareholders and policyholders of insolvent reinsurers will have an uncompromising understanding of the application of Illinois law to asset distribution.
277. Id. at 444, 537 N.E.2d at 780.
278. Id. at 437, 537 N.E.2d at 776. The court permitted the direct appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(b) because the case involved the public interest. ILL. S. CT.
R. 302(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 302(b) (1987).
279. 127 Ill. 2d at 442, 537 N.E.2d at 779.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 445, 537 N.E.2d at 780. Because section 205(1) establishes a rule of absolute priority, the court held that no succeeding class of claimants may share in the distribution of assets until the claims of those with senior interests are satisfied in full. Id. at
444, 537 N.E.2d at 780. The court emphasized that the imposition of a constructive trust
would provide the shareholders a super-priority ahead of all other claimants in the liquidation proceedings. Id. The funds that the shareholders wanted to have impressed with a
constructive trust were assets of the company in liquidation; therefore, the shareholders'
claims were subject to the section 205(1) priority schedule. Id. at 446, 537 N.E.2d at 782.
282. Id. at 447, 537 N.E.2d at 781.
283. Id.
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VI.

LEGISLATION

A.

Alien Insurers

[Vol. 21

The Survey year also saw the Illinois General Assembly approve
legislation requiring out-of-State insurers ("alien insurers") to
maintain a deposit of assets in trust within the State of Illinois. 2s
The new law will help to protect the public against insolvent insurers who fail to fund judgments against policies issued in the State.
The responsibilities and obligations of troubled alien insurers
under policies issued in the State will be met to the extent of the
required deposit.
B.

Long-Term Care

The Illinois General Assembly also approved legislation that
will include long-term health care within the classification of life or
endowment insurance or annuity contracts. 2 5 Long-term health

care consists of professional nursing care, custodial nursing care,
and non-nursing custodial care provided in a nursing home or at
an insured's residence.28 6 Through this legislation, the General Assembly established a statutory and regulatory framework to be applied to long-term care policies. This law will subject long-term
care policies to the same limitations and restrictions as life insurance policies.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Illinois courts decided several significant cases during this Survey year. The Illinois Supreme Court underscored the application
of the initial permission doctrine and clarified the priority status of
shareholders during liquidation proceedings. Also of note were appellate decisions refining the scope of the pollution exclusion, inter284. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 672a (1988). The statute requires that the trusteed
assets equal:
i) the sum of its minimum capital and surplus;
ii) the amount of its liabilities to policyholders, net of reinsurance for which
credit is allowed minus:
i) the sum of the amount of all of its general state deposits;
ii) the amount of its special state deposits;
iii) the amount of its reinsurance recoverable on paid losses;
iv) the amounts of its notes and bills receivable;
v) the amount of agents' balances and uncollected premiums;
vi) and the amount of its funds held by or deposited with reinsureds.
Id. para. 672b.
285. Id. para. 616.
286. Id.

1990]

Insurance Law

479

preting for the first time the term "occurrence" in a liability policy,
and determining excess insurers' liability for post-judgment interest. The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District also addressed the difficulty inherent in an insurer's attempt to simplify
claims made policy language. Finally, the Illinois General Assembly passed important legislation, particularly with regard to alien
insurers.

